El-Watan        Asharq Al-Awsat        As-Safir        Al-Fourat        Al-Quds Al-Arabi        Al-Itihad        Al-Ahram        An-Nahar        Ad-Doustour        El-Khabar    
Iran
Opinion
Military and Security - Peace Process - USA Europe
Keyhan, Iran
"Russia in Syria"
On April 11, an editorial by Sa'dollah Zarei in the conservative Keyhan daily said: "In recent days, the world's media and political circles have been discussing the future of the security and political process in Syria a great deal. These analyses focus mainly on the agreement between Russia and America on the future of Bashar al-Asad. Among the most important points that observers noted in their analyses and speculations was the withdrawal of Russia's military forces from Syria. However, there is a wide gap between what is said in all these analyses and what may probably happen. Allow me to ask some questions about Russia's behaviour and its impact and then assess the probable answer to each question.

"What weight does Syria carry in Russia's foreign policy balance? Is it heavy or light? Up to what extent is Russia's interaction with the West based on its policy on Syria? A little or a lot? Is Russia's security situation such that it will inevitably have to exchange Syria for Ukraine? In other words, Russia will take Ukraine and deliver Syria to the West! Within this context, has Syria been or not been basically part of the East Bloc and then part of the Russian satellites in its historic relations in the past 50 years? Up to what extent are Russian-Syrian military relations? Up to what extent is the Syrian Army dependent on Russian arms? With what objective did Russia become involved in Syria's security dossier in mid-Mehr and why did it withdraw its forces about six months later? Does not granting part of the pivotal role in the Geneva talks to Russia and its secret deal with America mean weakening the role of Iran and plac! ing the fate of Iran's ally in the hands of the Moscow-Washington deal? In this case and given the unclear result of the secret Kremlin-White House talks, why was it necessary for us to strive for five years to maintain the Syrian government and offer so many valuable martyrs in doing this? And finally, based on experience, can we trust Russia's game?

"The number of such questions in the media, particularly in cyberspace, indicates on the one hand how sensitive the Syrian issue is and, on the other hand, what a great volume of propaganda and doubt-mongering there is regarding Syria's future. Having said this, I will list some points in answer to these questions.

"1. Given the known method of the West's media empire - propaganda - in projecting news and reports and achieving a result in the project of the West's information and political circles, one could say that a large volume of these doubts and orientations towards them are calculated steps aimed at pulling the rug from under the Syrian government's feet; and, of course, this effort of starting a wave of reports about what it has experienced in Syria every day has been going on for the past five years!

"2. Syria's weight in Russia's political balance is heavy - without Russia's weight being necessarily heavy in Syria's foreign policy balance. I will explain this. Syria and its Mediterranean shores is the sole region that Russia has at its disposal up to a certain extent in the Middle East and North Africa that are in contact with the southern areas of the NATO basin. Any plan that could affect the continuation of Russia's presence in this sensitive region is definitely contrary to Russia's national interests and security. Meanwhile, Russia cannot trust an agreement with the West that will remove al-Asad and, in tandem, remove Russia's influence. Therefore, we could say that from a geopolitical aspect and the perspective of strategic interests, the possibility of Russia's agreement with the West over the current Syrian government does not exist, unless the Russians make a mistake in the discussions, in which case - given Iran's good relations with Syria - this! could be corrected, as we have seen during the past two years with, at least, two cases of such a mistake and its correction.

"3. Given Russia's domination in eastern Ukraine and its domination in the Crimean Peninsula and, as a result, the Russian Army's domination in the Black Sea, there is no reason for Russia to hand over Syria in order to reach Ukraine. In the Ukrainian issue now, it is the pro-Western Kyiv government that is concerned over Russia's realm of influence and the expansion of Russia's military security in eastern and southern Ukraine. Therefore, what is repeatedly said in Iran about Russia wanting to exchange Syria with Ukraine does not correlate with reality.

"4. What weight does Russia carry in Syria? Undoubtedly, Russia is one of the influential countries in the Syrian dossier. Russia's military presence on the shores of Latakia and Tartus, as well as Russia's military agreements with Syria, have granted it a noteworthy position. However, this position compared to that of Iran and the Hezbollah is not considered as "strategic" at all. Basically, Russia and Syria have strategic differences over some strategic issues, but such differences do not exist between Damascus and Tehran. For example, during the 33-day war with the Zionist regime on the one side and the Lebanese Hezbollah on the other, evidence shows that some of Russia's Jewish soldiers fought alongside Israeli soldiers against the Hezbollah in the outskirts of Bint Jubayl, while during the Syrian war, they were completely alongside the Hezbollah both as far as arms and logistics were concerned. The arms' protocols signed between Syria and Russia now are ba! sed on not firing at Israel; and, of course, Syria is carrying this out up to a limited extent. Nevertheless, the weight of Russian influence in Syria is not so much that it can make a decision and promise on behalf of the Syrian government and its regional allies and execute it. In other words, Russia does not have a strategic relationship either with the Syrian government or the Syrian government's major rivals - the al-Nusra Front and DA'ISH - to be able to determine a situation in Syria. Russia is considered powerful only if it has Iran, the Hezbollah, and the Syrian government by his side; otherwise, it turns into a marginal country such as France and Britain.

"5. During the past 50 years, Syria has never been recognized as part of the East Bloc despite its good relations with the Soviet Union and Russia and it has not indicated that it is its ally. Probably, the main reason for this absence of alliance has been the Russians' active relations with the Zionist regime. At any rate, Syria has not been defined within the framework of Moscow's relations and outlooks. However, from the very outset of the Islamic Revolution's victory, Syria has been part of the resistance front and Iran's ally; and now, it owes its survival to Iran's special and effective assistance. Unlike Russia, which does not control any territory on the ground in Syria, the Hezbollah and Iran currently have direct control over parts of defensive and operation lines in central, north, and south Syria; and if Russia reaches an agreement with a third party country, which is not accepted by Iran, such agreement will certainly fail. Indeed, during the past ! 30 years, Iran's exclusion from any decision that has been made for the countries and the resistance movement has failed without any exception.

"6. Syria's reliance has not been exclusively on Russia arms. For a long time, Iran has been supplying Syria's strategic weapons. This is why during the 33-day war, al-Asad's government placed its Russian arms at the disposal of the Lebanese Hezbollah without any concerns about violating Russia's conditions, and Russia was unable to protest effectively. However, if Syria's arms came only from Moscow, the possibility of a unilateral abrogation of such an agreement by al-Asad would not exist.

"7. Russia became involved in Syria's security dossier at Iran's official request on 9 May. Two days after a high-ranking Iranian military delegation, it entered its air force and missile cover into the war against the Syrian terrorist and about five and a half months later, it withdrew part of its military forces from Syria. Meanwhile, the IRGC's agreement with Putin was for a maximum of a five-month period. After the end of this period, Russia withdrew only part of its forces from Syria. Meanwhile, when Russia became involved in Syria at Iran's invitation, this was deemed necessary and it was effective. It withdrew part of its forces from Syria even though withdrawing all its forces would not inflict any harm to the Syrian government or security system. Moreover, Iran's conclusion was also that it would be best for all of the Russian forces to be withdrawn. The truth is that last summer, because of the advancements of the terrorists from mid-! spring to mid-summer in Idlib, al-Shaykh Miskin, Sukhna, and Tadmur, the terrorists had been emboldened. Under those conditions, Syria needed a psychological shock. Meanwhile, the Hezbollah had occupied the sensitive Zibdani region before the arrival of Russia.

"This shock was inflicted in mid-Mehr. The army and its associated forces carried out the Nasr-2 operations in western Aleppo with a boosted morale; and with this operation, they actually determined the fate of the Syrian war. Thus, when the Russians withdrew part of their forces, there was no longer any need for them. Therefore, saying that Iran and Syria were caught by surprise by this is actually not true.

"8. Political negotiations are a requirement for Syria. Iran has always emphasized it in addition to military operations, and it has even played an effective role in such negotiations, particularly in the recent two rounds of talks in Munich and Geneva. Meanwhile, Russia plays a two-dimensional role, part of which is based on developments on the ground, regarding which it is entirely coordinated with Iran, and the other part, is Russia's special proposal that is mainly cantered on federalism. Iran, without rejecting or confirming believes that it is too early to discuss this issue, and it deems it to be outside the competence of participants in the political talks in Geneva."
Co-Founder: Nicholas Noe
Address any queries to:
info@mideastwire.com